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Specifying and Verifying 
Requirements of Real-Time Systems 
Anders P. Ravn, Member, IEEE, Hans Rischel, Member, IEEE, and Kirsten Mark Hansen 
Abstracf- An approach to specification of requirements and 
verification of design for real-time systems is presented. A system 
is defined by a conventional mathematical model for a dynamic 
system where application specific states denote functions of real 
time. Specifications are formulas in duration calculus, a real- 
time interval logic, where predicates define durations of states. 
Requirements define safety and functionality constraints on the 
system or a component. A top-level design is given by a con- 
trol law: a predicate that defines an automaton controlling the 
transition between phases of operation. Each phase maintains 
certain relations among the system states; this is analogous to 
the control functions known from conventional control theory. 
The top-level design is decomposed into an architecture for a 
distributed system with specifications for sensor, actuator, and 
program components. Programs control the distributed compu- 
tation through synchronous events. Sensors and actuators relate 
events with system states. Verification i s  a deduction showing that 
a design implies requirements. 
Zndex Terms- Real-time systems, requirements engineering, 
specification, verification. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N engineer who is designing an embedded computer A system must have a deep insight in the properties of 
the controlled physical processes. When the system is safety 
critical, it becomes particularly important that this insight 
be made explicit and forms the basis for design. This was 
already observed by Heninger [12] in connection with the A7 
flight program, and the viewpoint is pursued in later work by 
Parnas, for example [32]-[34] and appears also in [18]. It has 
led to increased focus on requirements engineering [4]. The 
challenge, however, is to find suitable mathematical theories 
and notations that allow a designer to record such insight. 
It is also crucial, but often neglected, that the theory shall 
make it practical for a designer to use mathematical reasoning 
when checking that a design conforms to the requirements. 
In our work with case studies within the Provably Correct 
Systems (ProCoS) project [3] we have studied the problem 
of specifying and verifying total system requirements [ 131, 
[36], [37]. This paper describes the resulting approach to 
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requirements engineering, design, and verification for real-time 
control systems. 
A central property of such systems is that they can be 
modeled by states changing over time. The theory of dynamic 
systems, see, e.g., [23], or more specifically control theory, 
see, e.g., [7], [22], are rather specialized, however. They 
concentrate on systems that can be described by a single 
invariant or control law in the form of a differential equation, 
or in the discrete case a difference equation with a fixed 
time step. In order to be really tractable, the equations are 
restricted to be linear, although some results have been reached 
for nonlinear systems, e.g., [17]. Dynamic systems theory 
is thus not readily applicable to systems with varying time 
steps, nondeterministic state changes, or with control laws that 
depend on modes of operation. Furthermore, the notations are 
not well suited for composition of interacting systems, see 
e.g., part XI1 of [46]. 
Composition seems the only way of dealing with the com- 
plex state spaces that arise whenever programming is involved, 
thus we were led to investigate logic where the intimate rela- 
tionship between conjunction and composition of concurrently 
active systems [16] can be used as a composition principle. 
The logic should also be able to specify real-time constraints, 
and not just partial ordering of actions. There are many real- 
time logics, but they seem to fall into two broad classes: 
explicit time or implicit time. With explicit time formalisms, 
time is an ordinary variable, represented by event occurrence 
symbols as in RTL [19]. The time variable may also represent 
a time interval, see, e.g., [43], or it may be a variable in a 
temporal logic [35]. In explicit time logic, timing constraints 
are encoded as inequations over arithmetic expressions in time 
variables. Through some experiments we found this approach 
to be less satisfactory because there is no clear relationship 
between a natural language formulation of constraints and the 
resulting inequations. We observed that the timing constraints 
seem to be formulated as constraints on the duration of critical 
states. Implicit time logic, e.g., metric temporal logic [21], 
[35] or ISL [SI recognize this by using temporal operators 
that constrain the extent of a state. It is, however, not possible 
to express critical durations of the following form: “Within 
any period of length T, the critical state S must only occur c 
% of the time.” Such formulations describe a constraint on 
the sum of an arbitrary number of extents and leads to a 
duration concept, i.e., a logic where time is observed through 
the accumulated presence of a state. It was through joint work 
in the ProCoS project that duration calculus emerged [47]. 
It is based on interval temporal logic [l], [2], [lo], [29], 
0098-5.589/93$03.00 0 1993 IEEE 
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[42] and the duration concept. Duration calculus gives us 
the means to describe critical durations, progress from state 
to state, and stability of a state. Furthermore, it has a set 
of rules that have been useful when reasoning about timing 
properties. 
Concurrently with development of duration calculus, we 
experimented with ways of applying the theory in a systematic 
manner to requirements specification, design, and verification. 
Through many iterations the following approach has emerged: 
1) Top-level requirements are specified by constraints on a 
set of entities X representing the relevant physical states 
as a function of real time. The constraints are typically a 
conjunction of formulas. One class of formulas constrain 
the duration of critical states. Another class of formulas 
specify progress properties: within a certain time the 
system should move from one state to another. 
2) A top-level design is given by some assumptions and a 
control law. The assumptions record the intrinsic design 
of the physical system (the Nut relation in [34]). They 
are requirements that the system imposes on the envi- 
ronment, for instance, that certain states are considered 
physically impossible or that certain progress properties 
are ensured by physical processes. The control law 
consists of two parts: 
and the Statechart formalism [15]. The decomposition into an 
architecture is primarily inspired by Roscoe and Reed’s work 
on timed CSP [38], [41], and He Jifeng’s work on real-time 
semantics [20]. 
Section I1 summarizes duration calculus. Section 111 presents 
the running example and the (informal) requirements. Section 
IV formalizes system requirements. Section V introduces a 
top-level design with a control law. The top-level design is 
verified in section VI. Section VI1 specifies the architecture. 
Verification is in Section VIII, followed by the conclusion in 
Section IX. 
11. SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE 
We use the well-known time-domain model of systems and 
control theory [7], [22], [23] for modeling systems. A system is 
described by a collection of states (often called state variables) 
that are functions of time, modeled by the real numbers. 
Properties of systems are expressed by constraining the 
states over time. We wish to express requirements and design 
without explicit mentioning of particular time instants, and 
introduce a notation that is a real-time interval logic based on 
state durations [14], [47]. 
a) A finite state machine or automaton describing how 
control progresses through a number of phases. This 
P. 
A. syntar 
together with (notation for) their value domains Typex, 
is specified by a formula Over a phase control state we (Upper case) X 7  ‘7 . . . for the states 
_.  
b) A set of phase requirements that for each phase de- 
fine progress and stability constraints to be satisfied 
during that phase. A phase requirement determines 
also whether the phase is stable or control shall 
enter a new phase. 
3) An architecture is defined. It consists of specifications 
for a set of concurrently operating sensor, actuator and 
program components that synchronize through events. 
This distributed system is controlled by a scheduler. 
The scheduler maintains a trace state tr, recording the 
sequence of events passed between components. In order 
to ensure that a conjunction of component specifications 
remain consistent, we cannot allow upper bounds on 
the duration of a phase (this reflects that a set of 
synchronized state machines can only move when all are 
ready). Upper bounds are thus rewritten as readiness to 
progress, using a private state Ref (cf. [16]) for each 
component. The scheduler ensures progress when all 
components indicate that they are ready to proceed. The 
system state X is also distributed as private states for 
components. 
This is an outline of the approach; but we hasten to add that 
there are still many points that need investigation; we return to 
some of these points in the conclusion. A similar approach to 
Requirements Capture and top-level design is found in Parnas’ 
work [34]. Use of finite state automatons to specify designs 
for safety-critical systems are also investigated in [18] and 
as a paradigm for fault-tolerant systems in [40]. It is also 
the basis for the ProCoS program specification language [31] 
Typelr, . . . , given in a suitable specification language, such 
as Z (cf. [44]) or VDM (cf. [5]). This language must comprise 
a number of standard data types with operators and constants, 
including the type R of real numbers and the type Bool of 
Boolean. We denote the Boolean constants by tt and ff (the 
names true and false are reserved for duration formulas). We 
use lower-case names a, b, . . ., x, y ,  . . ., to denote constants 
and variables of any type. As usual in mathematical logic, a 
variable is an arbitrary value that may be bound by a quantifier, 
whereas a constant is fixed in each interpretation. 
State Expressions and State Assertions. A state expression 
may be of any type and is generated by 
1) Any state, constant and variable is a state expression. 
2) Any well-formed expression formed from an n-ary oper- 
ator symbol and state expressions SI, . . . , S, is a state 
expression. 
A state assertion is a state expression of type Bool .  
Durations and Duration Terms. For any state assertion P, 
J P  is a duration and of type R. A duration term is also of 
type R and generated by 
1) Durations, real constants, and real variables are duration 
terms. 
2) Any well-formed expression formed from an n-ary op- 
erator symbol of type R and duration terms T I ,  . . . , T, 
is a duration term. 
The symbol l is used as an abbreviation for Jtt. 
Duration Formulas. Any expression formed from an n-ary 
predicate symbol on R and duration terms r1, . . . , T, is an 
atomic duration formula. A duration formula is of type Bool 
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and generated by 
1) Atomic duration formulas and the special symbols true 
and false are duration formulas. 
2) If V I  and V2 are duration formulas, so are the ex- 
pressions ( T V ~ ) ,  (VI V V2) and (Vx)V1, where z is 
a variable. 
3) If V I  and V2 are duration formulas, so is the expression 
P I  ; V2). 
B. Semantics 
An interpretation Z of our formal system corresponds to a 
particular execution (run) of the system, where each state X 
denotes a function 
Z(X) : [O, m) 4 T y p e x  
giving the state as function of time from the start t = 0, 
and where each constant a is interpreted as a value Z(a) of 
appropriate type. For given interpretation Z, a valuation v 
asigns a value V ( z )  to each variable. By evaluating expres- 
sions for each point of time, the interpretation extends to state 
expressions, which denote functions of time. A constant a or 
variable z is hereby interpreted as the function with constant 
value Z(a) or U(z). 
An observation interval (or interval for short) is a closed 
and bounded interval [b, e] C [0, 00). For given interval [b, e] ,  
the duration J P  of a state assertion P denotes the real number 1 
le X P ( t )  dt 
where 
1 for Z(P) ( t )  = tt 
X P ( t )  = { 0 for Z ( P ) ( t )  = ff 
which is the measure of the set of points in [b,e] where 
the interpretation of P has value tt. It is assumed that 
all state assertions denote integrable functions of time. The 
interpretation then extends to duration terms and duration 
formulas on each interval: the interpretation of duration terms 
and atomic duration formulas is defined on each interval [b, e] 
by evaluating expressions using the values of subterms on 
the same interval. The formulas true and false as well as 
composite duration formulas TV, VI V V2 and (Vz)V are 
interpreted on each interval [b,e] in the same way as usual 
logical formulas in predicate logic, cf. [ll]. 
The interpretation of a “chop” formula V1;V2 on an 
interval [b,e] use interpretations of the subformulas V I  and 
V2 on subintervals of [b, e]. It has the value tt iff a “chop” 
point m (b 5 m 5 e )  can be found such that VI is tt on 
[b,m] and D2 is tt on [m,e] .  
Validity. A duration formula V holds on the interval [b, e] 
in the interpretation Z iff V has value tt on [b,e] for any 
valuation U for 2. 
The formula V holdsfrom start for the interpretation Z iff it 
holds on any interval of the form [0, T ]  for the interpretation Z. 
A duration formula V is valid (a tautology) iff it holds 
for every interval [b,e] in any interpretation Z. (Note that 
the validity of a chop formula on an interval VI; Vz 
[b,e] may depend on different chop points m for different 
interpretations.) 
It is sufficient for a formula to be valid that it holds from 
start for every interpretation Z (this uses that shifting all 
functions in an interpretation Z a fixed amount of time b yields 
another interpretation Z‘, such that V holds on [b, e] for Z 
exactly when V holds on [0, e - b] for 2’). 
Finite Variability. Interpretation of states has been confined 
to integrable functions in order to make the concept of duration 
well defined. In order to have a well-founded induction, we 
require that interpretation of any state assertion P has finite 
variability: any interval [b, e] can be divided into finitely many 
subintervals with 2( P) constant on each open subinterval. 
C. Specifications and Refinement 
A specification for a system is a duration formula V. An 
interpretation Z is said to satisfi, the specification if V holds 
from start for 2. For specifications V I  and V2 we say, that 
V2 is a refinement of VI if any interpretation satisfying V2 
also satisfy VI, It follows that V2 is a refinement of Vl if the 
duration formula 
v2 * Dl 
is valid. 
D. Deductions 
A primary goal of using mathematical modeling is the 
ability to calculate properties of the model. The calculations 
for our notation are deductions, verifying that the validity of 
some formulas implies the validity of others. 
It is a goal for the work on duration calculus to formal- 
ize deductions such that verification is done by calculations 
without any reference to a semantical model. The work has 
not yet reached that stage, but a number of useful axioms 
and deduction rules have been found. They are listed in the 
Appendix at the end of the paper. It has been proved (cf. 
[14]) that this formalization of the duration logic is a relative 
complete extension of real-valued interval temporal logic. 
Most verifications for a real-time system consist of case 
analysis for a moderate number of cases. The individual 
cases have deductions that are mostly simple calculations. 
We give manually developed deduction outlines by necessity. 
The calculations, however, are simple and stereotypic, so there 
is reasonable hope for assistance from mechanical deduction 
asistants. 
E. Abbreviations 
We use standard abbreviations A, +, e, 3, and we intro- 
duce abbreviations for commonly used duration formulas, with 
a state assertion P, duration formulas V, VI, and V2, and a 
positive time constant t as shown in Table I. The abbreviations 
have the following semantics: 
holds on point intervals [b,b] 
holds on [b, e] if P has value tt almost every- 
where in [b,e] and if b < e 
holds on [b, e] if V holds on some subinterval 
r i  
cpi 
02) 
of [b, el 
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TABLE I 
ABBREVIATIONS 
Abbreviation Formula Legend 
r i  C = O  Point 
ur = E )  A ( t  > 0) Almost 
everywhere P 
vi 
O D  true: v: true Somewhere V 
P14P2 ( P I  : t rue )  3 ’02 follows Dl 
(Dl v 
(P1:Dz;  t r u e ) )  
02, 
’Dl 4 V2 
holds on [b,e] if V holds on any subinterval 
holds on an interval with V I  holding on 
an initial subinterval if 232 holds on some 
subinterval from the point. (if any) where Vl 
ceases to hold 
V I  4- 372 holds on an interval with V I  holding on an 
initial subinterval if V2 starts holding within 
time t. 
of [b, el 
The following rules of precedence are used: 
first: 1, 0, 0 
second: V , A, ; 
third: a, - + , - t -  
The logical operators are overloaded: they are used for state 
GM supply 0 Ignition transformer --ws Flame 
U Flame detector 
Heatreq signal 
Fig. 1. Gas bumer. 
happens when gas does not ignite after 0.5 s. The flame 
fails if it disappears while gas is supplied. 
The same timing constant has been used in 2) and 3) in order 
to allow a simple design. 
Iv. SYSTEM MODEL AND REQUIREMENTS 
In order to formalize the requirements to the gas burner we 
introduce the following Boolean valued states: 
Heatreq, Flame, Gas,  Ignition : Boo1 
They express the physical state of the thermostat, the flame, 
the gas supply, and the ignition transformer as depicted in Fig. 
1. The informal requirements for the gas burner can then be 
formalized using duration formulas on the system model. 
1) For safety, gas must never leak for more than 4 s in any 
period of at most 30 s 
Reql G f? 5 30 + (Gas A TFlame) 5 4 s 
This is a critical duration constraint. 
60 s 
2) Heat request off shall result in the flame being off after 
assertions as well as duration formulas, but the meaning can 
be inferred from the type of the operands, e.g., “V” denotes 
disjunction for state assertions in “[PI V P4” and disjunction 
for duration formulas in “[PI] V [ P z l . ”  
This is a guarded progress constraint. The guard is 
[THeatreql and the progress is from an initial point 
[l to [TFlame] within 60 s. 
3) Heat request shall, after 60 s, result in gas burning, 
111. A GAS BURNER SYSTEM 
Our example is a simplified version of a computer controlled 
(on-off) gas burner described in [45]. This is a safety-critical 
system as an accident may occur if an excesive amount of 
unburned gas leaks to the environment. Small gas leaks cannot 
be avoided during ignition. A burning flame may also be blown 
out causing some gas to leak before the failure is detected. 
The gas bumer is controlled by a thermostat and the gas is 
ignited by an ignition transformer, cf. Fig. 1. The informal 
requirements are as follows: 
1) For safety, gas must never leak for more than 4 s1 in 
any period of 30 s at most. 
2) Heat request off shall result in the flame being off after 
60 s. 
3) Heat request shall after 60 s result in gas burning unless 
an ignite or flame failure has occurred. A n  ignite failure 
We use seconds as the time unit. 
unless an ignite or flame failure has occurred 
Reqs e [Heatreq] + 
(11 -60- [Flamel)  
v 0 IgniteFail v 0 FlameFail 
An ignite failure happens when gas does not ignite 
within 0.5 s: 
IgniteFail e i( [Gas A Ignition1 
+ ([I -0.5- [F lame] ) )  
The flame fails if it disappears while gas is supplied 
FlameFail e 
T( [Gas] + 10 ( [ F l a m e ] ;  ~ 1 F l a m e l ) )  
A formula -0 ( [ P I ;  [,PI) means stability of P: P 
cannot change to 1 P .  
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The total system requirements is the conjunction of the 
critical duration constraint Reg1 and the guarded progress 
constraints Req2 and Req3 
ReqAll 2 Reg1 A Req2 A Reqs 
The requirements should hold for any interval 
Rep g 0 ReqAll 
V. CONTROL MODEL AND CONTROL AW 
A control law expresses a top-level design of the system. 
It consists of a control function and assumptions about the 
behavior of the environment. The control function defines 
interaction between the control system and the environment. 
The assumptions define preconditions for the control law. In 
order to formalize the control law, the control model is formed. 
It is the system model with an additional state P that records 
the phase of operation of the controller. 
A. Gas Burner Phases 
We use a simple version of the control law in [45] (espe- 
cially simplified with respect to error recovery) for the gas 
burner. It has the following phases: 
Idle: Awaits heat request; no gas and ignition. It 
enters the Purge phase on heat request. 
Purge: Pauses for 30 s, and then Ignitel is entered. 
Ignitel: Starts ignition and gas supply; enters the Ig- 
nite2 phase after 1 s. 
Ignite2: Monitors the flame and enters the Burn phase 
if flame is sensed within 1 s. 
Burn: Ignition is switched off, but gas is still supplied. 
The Burn phase is stable until heat request 
goes off. The Idle phase is then entered and 
the gas is turned off. 
We use the simple error recovery procedure of returning 
to Idle. If a flame is not sensed within 1 s in Ignite2 
(ignite failure), or if the flame disappears during the Burn 
phase (flame failure), then the Idle phase is entered and the 
gas is turned off. The 30 s Purge pause ensures a sufficient 
distance between periods with leaking gas. 
B. Control Automaton 
We describe the possible phase transitions by means of a 
finite state automaton with states corresponding to the phases. 
The automaton is shown in Fig. 2. The automaton is defined 
in the control model using the state P giving the current phase 
of the system. 
P : {idle ,purge,  i g n i t e l ,  i gn i t e2 ,  burn} 
Its value domain is the finite set of phase names, and the 
following state assertions describe the individual phases 
I d l e  e P = i d l e  
Purge 2 P =purge  
I g n i t e 1  g P =  i g n i t e 1  
Ign i t e2  P =  i g n i t e 2  
Burn P = burn 
Purge 
Ignite2 Ignitel 
Fig. 2. Phase transitions for the gas burner. 
The automaton is defined by untimed progresss constraints 
Phases Ini t  A Trans  
where Inzt expressses that the automaton starts in the Idle 
phase 
Inzt 2 [ ]  -+ [Idle] 
and Trans  defines the phase transitions 
Trans  2 U( 
([Idle] -+ [Purge]) 
A ([Purge1 -, [ Ign i t e i ) )  
A ( [ I g n i t e i l +  lIgnite21) 
A ([Ignite21 -+ ([Burn] V [Idle]))  
A ([Burn] -+ [Idle])  ) 
i.e. Idle is followed by Purge, Purge is followed by 
Ignitel, etc., cf. Fig. 2. 
Phase Requirements. The predicate PhaseReq specifies 
the monitoring and control of system states for each phase 
PhaseReq 2 O(Id1eReq A PurgeReq 
A IgnitelReq 
A Ignite2Req A BurnReq)  
In the formulas, the constant € 1  denotes an upper bound 
on progress. Any move will be performed within time ~ 1 .  
The constant € 2  gives, on the other hand, a lower bound on 
stability. The system will not move before time € 2 .  We assume 
that 0 < €2 < ~ 1 .  
The Idle phase is stable at least € 2  beyond -Heatreg. 
The Idle phase is left before Heatreq has lasted ~ 1 .  During 
the Idle phase Gas and Ignition are turned off within ~1 
IdleReq 2 
(rlHeatreq1; e 5 €2 3 10 ([Idle];  [ d d l e ] ) )  
A ([Idle1 A [Heatreg] + e 5 E ~ )  
A ([Idle] =+ ( [ I  ~ € 1  v+ [ i G a s  A i l g n z t i o n ] ) )  
Notice that e 5 €1 in the second clause can be rewritten to 
the progress constraint 
[l - E ~  v+ false 
In conjunction with the untimed phase constraint, it will give 
a next phase within ~ 1 .  
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1 
A completed Purge phase lasts approximately 30 s, and 
Gas and Ignition are off within € 1  
PurgeReq 2 
( [-Purge] ; C 5 30 + -0 ( [Purge] ; [-Purge] )) 
A ([Purge] + C 5 30 + E ~ )  
A ([Purge] + ( [ I  ~ € 1  .c) [-Gas A TIgni t ionl))  
The first clause denotes an unconditional stability of Purge 
for at least 30 s. 
A completed Ignitel phase lasts approximately 1 s, and 
Gas and Ignition are on within € 1  
IgnitelReq 2 
( [ - Igni te l ] ;  C 5 1 + -0 ( [ Igni te i ] ;  [ l I g n i t e l ] ) )  
A ( [ Ign i t e l ]  + 5 1 + ~ 1 )  
A ([Ignite11 + ( [ I   NE^ .c) [Gas A Igni t ion]))  
The Ignite2 phase does not enter I d l e  after less than 
1 s and it does not enter Burn after less than € 2  of Flame. 
It lasts at most 1 + € 1  and it is left within € 1  if the Flame 
comes on. The Ignite2 phase maintains Gas and Ignition 
Ignite2Req 
A (  flame] ; 5 € 2  + -0 (  burn] ; [Burn] )) 
A ([Ignite21 + C 5 1 + € 1 )  
A ([Ignite21 A [Flame] + C 5 € 1 )  
A ([Ignite21 + [Gas A Ignitionl)  
([-Ignite2];! 5 1 + -0 (rIgnite21; [Idle]))  
Note, that Trans  implies that Burn can only be entered 
from Igni te2.  Hence [-Burn] in the second clause could 
be replaced by [ Igni tea l .  
The Burn phase persists € 2  beyond Heatreq and Flame. 
It is left within € 1  if Heatreq or Flame goes off. During the 
Burn phase Gas is maintained, but Ignition is switched off 
within € 1  
BurnReq 
( [Heatreq A Flame] ; C 5 € 2  
+ -0 ([Burn] ; [-Burn])) 
A ([Burn] A [-Heatreg V -Flame] + C 5 € 1 )  
A ( [Burn] + [Gas])  
A ([Burn] + ( [ ]  N € 1  .c) [-Ignition])) 
C. Assumptions 
The control law also needs assumptions about the physical 
processes in the system. For the gas burner we have the 
following assumptions: 
No gas results in no flame within 0.1 s. 
Asml  G [-Gas1 + ( [ I  -0.l.c) [TFlame])  
Gas does not ignite when the ignition transformer is not 
operating. 
Asm2 G 
[-Ignition] + -0 ([-Flame];  [Flame])  
which should hold on any interval 
A s m  2 0 ( A s m l  A Asmn) 
VI. CORRECTNESS OF CONTROL LAW 
A control law is correct if it implements the requirements 
under the given assumptions. The formalized requirements, 
assumptions and control function allow correctness to be 
expressed formally as the implication 
A s m  A Phases A PhaseReq + Req 
We have Phases = Ini t  A Trans,  where In i t  decomposes 
into [ ]  or [Idle]; true.  It is easy to see that requirements 
hold for the point interval, thus [ ]  + Req. For [Idle] ; true, 
we use that the automaton returns to Id l e ,  such that this case 
is subsumed by 
A s m  A Trans  A PhaseReq + Req 
We now consider separate cases for each requirement: 
1) A s m  A Trans  A PhaseReq + Reql 
2)  A s m  A Trans  A PhaseReq + Reqz 
3) A s m  A Trans  A PhaseReq + Reqs 
A. Verification of Reg1 
We first use PhaseReq to estimate the duration of the 
critical state 
Leak G Gas A -Flame 
for each phase. 
estimates 
We define Limits to be the following 
Limits 
([Idle] + JGas 5 € 1 )  
A ([Purge] + $Gas 5 € 1 )  
A ([Ignite11 + C 5 1 + € 1 )  
A ([Ignite21 + 5 1 + € 1 )  
A ([Burn] + JTFlame 5 2 
The deduction of 
conjunction of 
El) 
A s m  A Trans  A PhaseReq + Limits 
can be split into simple cases for each conjunct. We take the 
first one in great detail 
IdleReq A [Idle] 
+ r ]   NE^ .c) [-Gas1 
+ JGas 5 ~1 V ( JGas  5 ~ 1 ; J G a s  = 0 )  
+ SGas 5 E I  V JGas 5 E I +  0 
+ r ]   NE^ .c) [-Gas A -Ignition] 
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and omit the deductions for the next three cases. The last case 
is 
The case analysis shows that an interval beginning in a 
Purge phase is most critical, and that Reg1 will be satisfied 
as long as €1 5 2/7. 
B. Verification of Reg2 
[7 BurnReq A 0 Asm2 A [Burn] 
+ 0 ( [+lamel + C 5 E ~ )  A 0 Asm2 
A ([]  NE^ -+ [dgn i t ion ] )  
+ 0 ( [TFlamel  + 
3 1 5  €1 V (C 5 €1; [Flame]) 
v (C 5 E ~ ;  ([+'lame] A C 5 c l ) )  
v (C 5 €1; [Flame] 
5 c1)A 
([I  ~ € 1  .cy -0 ([-Flame] ; [Flame])) 
; ( [+ ' lamel  A t 5 c1)) 
+ $-Flame 5 2 .  €1 
where we have used 
-0 ([+lame]; [Flame]) 
+ [Flame] v [ iF l ame l  v ( [F lamel ;  [TFlame]) 
The second step in the verification is also a case analysis. 
The cases are defined by the initial phase of an arbitrary 
interval. The premise is 
P r e l  e Trans  A 0 Limits A 1 5 30 
in 
1) P r e l  A ( [ Idle] ;  true) =$ $Leak 5 2 . €1 
2) P r e l  A ([Purge]; true) + $Leak 5 2 + 7 .  €1 
3) P r e l  A ( [ I g n i t e l ] ;  true) + $Leak 5 2 + 6 .  €1 
4) P r e l  A ( r Igni te21;  true) =$ $Leak 5 1 + 5 . €1 
5 )  P r e l  A ([Burn] ; true) + $Leak 5 4 . €1 
The calculations follow a pattern, where previous results 
are used 
P r e l  A ( [ Idle]  ; true) 
3 PTelA 
( [Idle1 
We start by proving that 1Heat req  maintains the I d l e  
IdleReq A [ d l e a t r e q l  A ( [ Idle] ;  true) 
A ( [Idle1 V 0 ( [Idle] ; [-Idle])) 
phase 
+ -0 ([Idle]; [ 4 d l e ] )  
+ [ Idle]  
The deduction of Regz is a case analysis, depending on the 
initial phase of the interval. The premise Pre2 is defined 
Prep e [ lHeat req]  A 0 Asml A 0 Trans  
A PhaseReq 
and the cases are 
1) P r e 2  A ( [ I d l e l ;  true) A C > 2 
+ (C 5 0.1 + E ~ ;  [ 4 ' l a m e l )  
+ (C 5 0.1 + 2 .  € 1 ;  [-+lame]) 
+ (C 5 1.1 + 3 .  €1; [+lame]) 
+ (C 5 2.1 + 4 .  €1; [+lame]) 
+ (C 5 32.1 + 5 . €1; [TFlame]) 
2) Pre2 A ( [Burn] ; true) A 
3) Prez A ( r Igni te21;  true) A > 5 
4) Pre2 A ( [ I g n i t e l ] ; t r u e )  A C > 7 
> 3 
5) P r e 2  A ( [Purge] ; true) A C > 38 
The individual calculations are of the usual form: 
Pre2 A ( [ Idle] ;  true) A > 2 
+ 0 (Asml A IdleReq) A [ Idle]  A 
+ 0.1; [+'lame] 
> 2 
+ 0 Asmi A (C 5 €1; [-Gas]) 
+ C 5 
where we have used that -Heatreg maintains I d l e .  The other 
cases are similar and the deductions are omitted. 
V ( [ Idle]  ; (( [Purge] ; true) A C 5 30))) C. Verification of Re93 
Assuming c1 < 0.5, which is compatible with €1 5 2/7, 
we deduce that Ignite2 only leads to Idle  in case of 
an IgniteFail .  
+ Limits A ( [ Id l e ]  V ( [ Id l e ] ;  [Purge])) 
+ $Gas 5 €1 V ($Gas 5 ~ 1 ; J G a s  5 €1) 
+ $GUS 5 2 . ~ 1  
0 Ignite2Req A ( [ I g n i t e l ] ;  rIgnite21; [ Idle])  
P r e l  A ( [Burn] ; true) + true; ( [Gas  A Ignition] A C 2 1 
+ 0 ([Gas A Ignition] A i ( C  5 0.5; [Flame])) 
+ 0 Igni teFai l  
+ P r e l  A ( [Burn] V ( [Burn] ; [ Idle]  ; t rue))  
+ Limits 
A 0 ([Flame] + C 5 0.5)); true 
A ([Burn] V ([Burn]; JLeak 5 2 . E ~ ) )  
+ $Leak 5 4 ' € 1  and that a Burn phase is preceded by Flame.  This is shown 
by contradiction 
The cases for I g n i t e l  and I g n i t e 2  are similar, and so is 
U Ignite2Req 
P r e l  A ( [Purge] ; true) A ( [TFlame A Igni te21;  [Burnl) 
3 (0 ( rlBurn1; [Burn] ) 
+ false 
3 P r e l  A ([Purge] 
+ $Leak 5 2 + 7 .  €1 
v ([Purge]; [ I g n i t e l ] ;  true)) A -0 ( [-Burn]; [Burn])); true 
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We also deduce that Burn maintains the Flame unless there 
is a FlameFail result: 
The second case can, as usual, be reduced using the previous 
BurnReq A ( [Flame A Gas]; [Burn]) Pres A ( [Purge] : true)  A e > 36 
3 [Gas] A ( [Flame] ; true) 
+ [Flame] ~ ( f  1 3 0 + ~ ~ ; ( ( [ 1 g n i t e i ] ; t r u e ) ~ e >  5 ) )  
=+ [Flame] V FlameFail 
3 Pre3 
V ( [Gas]  A 0 ( [ F l a m e ] :  [ -Flame]) )  =+ f 5 32 + 3 . €1; [ F ~ ~ v w ]  
and the third follows the pattern 
and finally that Heatreq without Flam.eFai1 maintains a 
Burn phase with Flame 
0 (BwnReq A -FlameFail) A [Heatreq] 
A ( [Gas A Flame] : [Burn] ; true)  
=+ 0 (BurnReq A TFlameFail) A [Heatreq] 
A (( [Gas A Flame] : [Burn]) 
V ( [Gas  A Flame]:  [Burn] 
; [TBurn] : t r u e ) )  
j ( [ F l a m e ] ;  [Flame A Burn]) 
V 0 (BurnReq 
A (([Burn] A [Heatreq A Flame])  
; I-Burnl)) 
=+ ( [Flame] ; [Flame A Burn] ) 
We can now proceed to the main deduction. This is also a 
case analysis, depending on the initial phase of the interval. 
We assume that € 1  5 1. The premise Pre3 is defined 
Pre3 [Heatreq] A Trans  A PhaseReq 
A 0 4 g n i t e F a i l  A 0 TFlameFail 
and the cases are 
1) Pres A ( [ I g n i t e l ] ;  true)  A e > 5 
=+ ( l  5 2 + 2 .  €1; IFlame])  
2) Pres A ([Purge] : true)  A 
+ (e 5 32 + 3 .  € 1 :  [Flame])  
3) Pre3 A ( [ Id l e ] ;  true)  A f > 37 
+ (e 5 32 + 4 .  €1; [Flame])  
4) Pres A ( [Burn] ; true) A l' > 38 
+ ( a  5 32 + 5 .  €1:  [Flame])  
5) Pres A ( [ Igni te21 ; true)  A e > 40 
3 ( l  5 33 + 6 .  €1; [Flame])  
> 36 
The individual calculations are 
Pres A ( [ I g n i t e l ] :  true)  A .! > 5 
+ Pre3 A ((e 5 1 + €1 A [ I g n i t e l ] )  
: (e 5 1 + €1 A rIgnite21) 
; ([Burn] V [ Id l e ] ) ;  true)  
Pres A ( 
( l  5 2 + 2 . €1 A (true; [Flame A G a s ] ) )  
; [Burn] ; true) 
=+ l 5 2 + 2 .  c1;  [Flame] 
where we have used the above results about I g n i t e 2  and 
Burn. 
Pres A ( [ Id l e ] ;  t rue )  A e > 37 
A ( [ I d l e  A Heofrrq ]  : f 5 32 + 3 . € 1  
3 0 IdleReq A P > 37 
: [ F l a m e ] )  
3 f 5 32 + 4 .  €1: [ F l a m e ] )  
The last cases have a surprise, because the observation may 
start just after a FlameFazl in the Burn phase 
Pres A ( [Burn] : true)  A > 38 
=+ Pre3 A ( [Burn] ; true)  A f > 38 
A (( [TFlame] ; true)  V ( [Flame] ; t rue) )  
A ( [-Flame] : t r u e ) )  v [Flame] 
A (e 5 € 1 :  [ Idle] :  t rue) )  V [Flame] 
3 (Pre3 A ( [Burn] ; true)  
=+ (Pres  A f > 38 
e 5 32 + 5 . z l ;  [Flame] 
and 
Pre3 A ( r Igni te21:  t rue )  A e > 40 
3 Pres A e > 40 A (e 5 1 + €1; [Burn]; t rue )  
3 f 5 33 + 6 .  €1: [Flame] 
In summary: the control law specifies a correct design if the 
constants €1 and € 2  are chosen such that 
< 217 and 0 < € 2  < € 1  
Notice that the latency €2 can be arbitrarily small. 
The control law can almost directly be used to implement 
the system with a processor that accesses sensor and actuator 
states. The progress constraints map to assignments, whereas 
stability constraints map to delays, either unconditionally or 
in a sensor-reading loop. 
There is, hovewer, an element of parallel processing in 
sensor readings. This indicates that a further decomposition 
of the design is useful. 
VII. ARCHITECTURE 
An architecture specifies a collection of selected compo- 
nents together with an interconnection scheme. A component 
is either a subsystem or an elementary component: a program, 
a sensor, an actuator or a timer. A program implements a state 
machine that takes the system through specified phases. In the 
general case, state transitions may depend on values computed 
from data collected in previous phases. A sensor monitors 
a physical system state, and it is ready to communicate the 
l ' r r  -  1 
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TABLE I I  
GAS BURNER ARCHITECTURE 
~~ ~ 
Component Alphabet Private States 
Heat request {HeatOn. HeatOff} RefHS : P n H S  
sensor HS H r c r t r ~ q  : Bool 
Flame sensor { FlOn. FlOf f } R e f F S  : P < \ F S  
F S  F I O J I I ~  : Bool 
Gas actuator { GasOn. GasOf f } RefGA : POGA 
GA G o s  : Bool 
Ignition { Ignon. IgnOf f } R e f I A  : P<r I A  
actuator I A  I g u / f r o i i  : Bool 
1 s timer T 1  { S e t l .  Out l}  R e f T l  : $/IT1 
30 s timer T30  iset.30. Out30) R e f ~ 3 0  : P n T 3 0  
Program P Event R e f p  : POP 
state value to a program when requested to do so. An actuator 
controls a physical system state, and it is ready to change 
the state to a communicated value from a program when so 
requested. A timer implements delays giving lower bounds on 
the duration of phases. 
The interconnection scheme that we propose aims at a dis- 
tributed system, where the components execute concurrently 
and synchronize through instantaneous, shared events. The 
synchronous communication paradigm is inspired by CSP [ 161. 
The interconnection scheme uses a set of events, Event, 
called the system alphabet. Each component C synchronizes 
on a subset nC 
Each component has a designated state Ref c, which records 
the subset of NC that is refused at a given time. Events that 
are not in NC are never refused. 
A scheduler observes the refusal states for all components 
and allows the components to move whenever no one refuses 
an event. Whenever such a move occurs, it is recorded in a 
history or truce of events 
Event called the C-component alphabet. 
tr : Event* 
It is the only shared state in the architecture and it  is only read 
by components. Refusal states are private for components, and 
the system states are distributed among sensors and actuators. 
A. Architecture of the Gas Burner 
For the gas burner we use the architecture shown in Table 11. 
In this case, where there is only one program component, 
system and program have the same alphabet 
Event = aHS U aFS  U NGA U aIA U nT1 U aT30 
The events have the informal meaning: heat request on, heat 
request off, . . ., set 30 s timer, expiration of 30 s timer. 
We let e range over Event and s over Event* in the 
following, and we denote the projection of t r  on a component 
alphabet aC by t r c  
trc g t r  n C  
B. General Properties 
Trace t r  accumulates the history of events for the system, 
i.e., an event occurring at time t is appended to the previous 
value of tr. The trace is empty initially 
Init tr  [l 4 [tr = 01; true 
and t r  is an increasing function of time (in the prefix ordering 
of sequences of events) 
This constraint allows a finite set of events to happen at one 
time. 
Event e is not appended to trace if it is refused by any 
component C 
W f Ref e [ v e E Refcl * stable (tr 1 {e}) 
CEComp 
where Comp is the finite set of components and where 
stable(tr  1 A)  3 s  : A *  0 [tr r A = s1 
expresses stability for the projection t r  1 A of the trace t r  
on a subset A & Event. 
Constraints W f R e f  and TrIn,cr allow a finite set of 
events to occur instantaneously and does not force anything 
to happen. The actual occurrence of events is controlled by 
a Scheduler. 
The general properties of trace and refusals are collected in 
the formula 
General Init tr  A 0 (TrIncr  A W f Re f )  
C. Scheduler 
The scheduler is the synchronization agent for the dis- 
tributed system 
Scheduler 2 0 (TrOne A TrStep  A Progress) 
Progress is ensured by insisting that the the trace t r  remains 
stable at most SI when some event e is not refused by all 
components 
Progress 2 stable (tr) A r A e 6 Refc] l < 51 
CtComp 
It follows that if an event e is accepted by all components 
for time 61 then the trace becomes extended with some event 
(which may be different from e). 
We shall not use true concurrency,2 so we introduce special 
constraints that force events to happen one at a time and with 
a minimal distance 52  
TrOne [tr = SI]; [tr = s 2 1  
[#s2  I #Sl + 11 
21f we  allow true concurrency, the refusal shall distinguish between e.g., 
willingness to participate in each of two events and willingness to participate 
in both events simultaneously. This distinction is possible with a more 
complicated definition of the refusal. 
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and 
TrStep  2 [tr # SI]; [tr = SI]; [tr # s11 
=.e>s2 
where # denotes the length of a sequence. Consistency 
dictates, that 62 < 61. 
D. Program 
In order to specify the program for the gas burner we 
introduce the following regular expression over the alphabet 
Event 
cyc le  = IgnOf f .GasOf f .HeatOnSet30. 
Out30.Set 1.IgnOn.GasOn. 
Out 1.Set I. 
(F10n.IgnOf f .(Heatof f + FlOf f )  
+out 1) 
p t r a c e  = pref ( cyc le* )  
where “pref’ denotes the prefix closure operation on a regular 
expression. 
The program is specified by a refusal constraint: the program 
refuses an event e if and only if the event does not extend the 
program trace t r p  (= t r )  to a member of p t r a c e  
Program [e E Refp] [ t r - ( e )  61 p t race l  
It can be verified that trace t r  always belongs to ptrace 
Scheduler A General A Program =+ PTrace  
where 
Ptrace U( [ ]  v [tr E p t r a c e l )  
In order to express the phase in terms of the trace, we 
introduce the projection trIn = t r  1 I n  of trace t r  onto 
the subalphabet 
I n  2 {FlOn, FlOf f ,  HeatOn, 
HeatOff,Out1,0ut30} 
It is obvious that trIn will have the projected property of 
Ptrace 
P InTrace  0 (11 V [trIn E inp t r ace ] )  
where the regular expressions 
incyc le  = HeatOn.Out30.0utl. 
(FlOn.(HeatOff + FlOff)  + Outl)  
i n p t r a c e  = pref (incycle’) 
are the projections of cyc le  and p t r a c e  on In .  
The phases are now described by 
I d l e  e trIn E i ncyc le*  
Purge @ trIn E incycle*.HeatOn 
I g n i t e 1  trIn E incycle*.HeatOn.Out30 
I g n i t e 2  @ trIn E incycle*.HeatOn.Out3O.Out 1 
Burn @ t r I n  E incycle*.HeatOn.Out3O.Outl.FlOn 
1 
Fig. 3. Phase transitions and in-events. 
It follows that the phase changes correspond to occurences of 
the in-event as shown in Fig. 3, i.e., 
General A Scheduler A Program =+ Phases  
E. Sensors 
The heat request sensor (HS) is specified as a conjunction 
HeatReqSensor O ( H S R e  f A HSReady) 
of a stability constraint: The HeatOn event is refused if 
Heatreq has been on for less than time 62 and the HeatOff 
event is refused if Heatreq has been off for less than time 62 
HSRef  2 
A ( r H e a t r e q l ; l <  62 
( [ iHeatreq];  e 5 62 3 [HeatOn E RefHsl) 
[HeatOff E RefHs]) 
and a progress constraint: The HeatOn event is not refused 
when has Heatreq been on for time 61 and the HeatOff 
event is not refused when Heatreq has been off for time 61 
HSReady 
([Heatreq] + ([I -61 --+ [HeatOn 61 RefHs])) 
A ([THeatreql + ( r ]  -61- [HeatOff 61 Ref~s ] ) )  
Flame sensor (FS ) has a similar specification 
F lamesensor  O ( F S R e  f A FSReady) 
where 
FSRef  g 
( [ iF l ame] ; e  5 62 3 [FlOn E RefFs]) 
A ( [Flame] ; e < 62 * [FlOf f E Ref FS] ) 
and 
FSReady 2 
( [Flame] (11 - 61 - ( 61 Ref  F S l ) )  
A ( [TFlamel 3 ( [I  - 61 y-t ( [FlOf f 61 Ref Fs] )) 
F. Actuators 
The gas actuator (GA) is specified as a conjunction 
GasActuator g Q G A R e a d y  A GAAct) 
of two progress constraints: the gas actuator never refuses 
GasOn or GasOff events 
GAReady e [RefcA = {} ]  v [ ]  
- 1 - r  --- 
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and, for an empty trace, the gas is off. Otherwise, the value 
stabilizes 61 after the latest GasOn or GasOff event 
GAAct 
( [ t r ~ ~  = 01 * [ ~ G a s l )  
A ([last(trGA) = GasOff] 
A ([last(trcA) = GasOn] 
a ( r  1 - s1 y-) w s i  )) 
+ ( r l w 6 1 +  [Gas l ) )  
where last(s) denotes the last element in the (nonempty) 
sequence s.  
The ignition actuator (IA) has a similar specification 
IgnztzonActuator U( IAReady A IAAc t )  
where 
IAReady g [Ref IA = {}] V 
and 
IAAct  2 
( f t r 1 A  = 01 
+ [ l lgn i t i on l )  
+ ([I  - S1 U* r-Ignition])) A ( [last(trIA) = IgnOff] 
A (rlast(tr1A) = IgnOn] 
+ ( [ 1 - SI - [Ignition] )) 
G. Timers 
The 1-s timer ( T i )  is specified as a conjunction 
Timer1 g O(T1Ready A T l R e f )  
of two progress constraints: the timer never refuses the set- 
timer event Se t  1, and accepts the time-out event Out 1 at most 
1 s after the last set-timer event. 
TlReady  
( r i  v rsetl e ~ e f ~ ~ 1 )  
A [last (trT1) = S e t l ]  A stable(trT1) 
-1-  [Out1 eRefT11) 
where 
T3OReady 
A [last ( t rTBO) = Set301 A stable(tr~30) 
(11 v [Set30 # R e f ~ 3 0 1 )  
+ ( [ ] ~ 3 0 +  [Out30 $! Ref~sol)  
and 
T30Ref 
[trTsO = 51; [ t r T B O  = s-(set30)] 
; [Out30 e Ref~301 
+ e > 3 0  
H. Composition 
The composite system is specified by the conjunction of the 
component specifications, the scheduler specification and the 
general properties 
System 2 
Program A HeatReqSensor A Flamesensor 
A GasActuator A IgnataonActuator A Timer1 
A Timer30 A Scheduler A General 
VIII. CORRECTNESS OF ARCHITECTURE 
We have already argued that the program implements the 
automaton 
General A Scheduler A Program * Phases 
It remains to verify that the architecture refines the Phase 
requirements. 
Here we use that Program is the only component that delays 
output events, i.e., events in the set 
Out 2 Event\In 
The scheduler ensures that the delay is, at most, 61. Thus we 
have 
System + Outprogress 
where 
Outprogress 2 0 ( [ t r  = s A nextout (s)] + c < 61) 
and a refusal constraint: The time-out event Out1 is only 
accepted 1 s after a set timer event S e t l .  
and 
nextOut(s) g 3e : Out 0 .-(e) E p t r a c e  
From Outprogress it follows that a sequence of n out-events 
will take at most n . 61 time units to complete. 
Each phase is defined by a sequence of out-events and is 
terminated by a single in-event or a choice between in-events, 
cf. the definition of p t r a c e  and inp t r ace .  The transition to 
a next phase will only happen when both the program and the 
sensor or timer are ready. 
Using these facts about the trace and the results about 
Outprogress we have the following: 
T l R e f  
[ t r T l  = s]; [trTl = s - (Se t l ) ] ;  [Out1 # RefT1] 
+ e > i  
From the timer specification it is easy to deduce 
rtrT1 = s]; [trTl = s-(SetI) l  
; [ t r T l  = s-(SetI ,Outl) l  
* l > l  
The other timer has a similar specification 
Timer30 2 O(T30Ready A T30Re f )  
System + 
0 (LIdle A LPurge A LIgnitel A Lignite:! A LBurn)  
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where the lemmas for the phases are 
LIdle e 
([Ignite11 ( [ I - 3 .  SI -rt 
(stable(tr) A [lastn(tr) = (IgnOff, GasOff)] 
A [HeatOn # Refp]))) 
A ( [ Id l e ] ;  [TIdle]  0 [HeatOn # RefHs A Id l e ] )  
LPurge e 
([Purge] + [last2(trGAuIA) = (IgnOff,GasOff)l) 
r\([Purge] + ( [ ] - 2 . 6 1 - 4  
(stable(tr) A [last(tr) = Set301 
A [Out30 # Refp]))) 
+ 0 rout30 # RefT3o A Purgel)  
A ( [Purge] ; [TPurge] 
LIgnitel 2 
( [ Idle]  + ( [ I  -4. 61 -rt 
(stable(tr) A [lasts(tr) = ( S e t l ,  IgnOn, GasOn)] 
A r O u t l  e Refpl))) 
A ( [ I g n i t e l l ;  [ T I g n i t e l l  
0 [Outl $! RefTl A Ignitell) 
LIgnite2 
( [ Igni te21 + [lastz(trGAUIA) = (IgnOn, Gason)]) 
([1gnite2] ( [ I  - 3 .  S1 -4 
(stable(tr) A [last(tr) = Set11 
A [FlOn # Ref A Out 1 # Ref 
A ( r Igni te21;  [ Idle]  
A ( r Igni te21;  [Burn] 
+ 0 [Out 1 # Ref A Igni te21 ) 
3 0 [FlOn # RefFs A Igni teZ])  
L B u r n  
([Burn1 + [last(trcr) = GasOnl) 
/\([Burn] + ( [ ] - 2 . 6 1 -  
(stable(tr) A [last(tr) = IgnOff] 
A [FlOf f # Ref A HeatOf f # Ref p] ))) 
A ( [Burn] ; [TBurn] + 
0 [(FlOff g! RefFs V HeatOff # RefHs) 
A Burn] ) 
We have used las t , (s) ,  n 2 1 to denote the subsequence 
formed by the last n elements of s (last,(s) s only defined 
when #s 2 n). 
We can now illustrate the verification of phase contraints by 
System + IdleReq. 
Stability under THeatreg is verified by deduction to a con- 
tradiction. We assume that €2 < 62 
H S R e  f A 0 LIdle A ([THeatreq];  C < € 2 )  
A 0 ( [ Idle] ;  [T Id le l )  
A 0 ( [ Idle]  ; [-Idle] 
a O L I d l e  A [HeatOn E RefHs] 
+U ([HeatOn E RefHsl A [HeatOn # RefHsl) 
+false. 
Progress to Purge is shown by a similar deduction where 
we assume that 4 . 61 < € 1  
Scheduler A 0 LIdle A HSReady 
A [ Idle]  A [Heatreql A 1 > € 1  
( [ I  -3  .61- ( [HeatOn # Refp] A stable(tr)) 
A ( [ I  -d1  -rt [Heaton # RefHs]) A C > ~1 
+ScheduleTA 
j false. 
Progress to -Gas and -Ignition follows from 
U LIdle A GAAct A IAAct  A [ Idle]  
A ( r 1 - 4 .  -rt [-Ignition]) 
+( r 1 - 4 .  v+ [TGas])  
Stability of Purge is verified as follows: 
0 T30Re f A 0 LPurge A ([-Purge] ; f! 5 30) 
A U ( [Purge] ; [+urge1 ) 
+U ( C  5 30 
A ([tr = s]; [tr = s-(Set30)] 
A T30Re f )  
; rout30 R @ f ~ 3 0 1 )  
j false. 
Verification of progress in Ignite1 requires 3 .61 < € 1 .  
For Ignite2 we have a new kind of deduction in order 
to verify [Gas A Ignition] throughout the phase. We look for 
a contradiction of 
0 [T(Gas A Ignition) A Ignite21 
First, we have, from the properties of ptrace, 
System A (true; rIgnite21) 
3 true; [Purge]; [ I g n i t e l ] ;  [ Igni te21 
System A 0 [-(Gas A Ignition) A Igni te21 
a O ( L I g n i t e 1  A Llgnite2 A GAAct A AAAct)  
We can now deduce 
A 0 ([Purge]; [ I g n i t e l ]  
; ([Ignite21 A 0 [ l ( G a s  A Igni t ion)] ) )  
+U (GAAct A I A d c t ) ~  
O ( C > 1 - 3 . 6 1  
A [last2 ( t r G A U I A )  = (IgnOn, GasOn)] 
A (true; [-(Gas A Igni t ion)] ) )  
3 false. 
1 -r -~--- 
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provided that 61 5 1 - 3 .  61; i.e., 4 .  S1 5 1 or 61 < 1/4. 
Maintenance of Gas in the Burn phase requires a similar 
argument. 
In summary: whenever 61 is chosen such that 5.61 < € 1  < 
2/7 the distributed system will work. Notice that the minimal 
latency 62 can be arbitrarily small because €2  has no lower 
bound. In other words: a faster computer will not invalidate 
the architecture. This is achieved by using explicit timers to 
implement delays. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
We have illustrated an approach to requirements engineering 
and design of real-time systems using mathematical specifi- 
cations of system requirements and system design. We have 
demonstrated how mathematical reasoning is used in verifying 
that designs satisfy requirements and in proving that a more 
detailed distributed design satisfies an abstract centralized 
design. 
Duration calculus has been our tool. This logic combines 
central properties of integral calculus with the serial compo- 
sition ability of interval logic and the parallel composition 
properties of usual logic. Furthermore, it has a conventional 
dynamic system as model, which gives a strong link to well 
established mathematical theories used in control engineering. 
The approach is still developing as we gain more under- 
standing of the abilities of duration calculus, and as we see 
how good design principles are reflected in the formulas. We 
now discuss some issues in the three stages of the approach. 
A. System Model and Requirements 
As presented here, the requirements are straightforward 
formalizations of user expectations. It would be useful to have 
a more systematic approach for eliciting these expectations. 
One possibility that we would like to investigate is to derive 
the safety requirements from the results of a systematic safety 
analysis of the system. This could, for instance, be done by 
formalizing the results of fault tree analysis, cf. the approach 
in the British Ministry of Defence draft standard for software 
in safety critical systems [27], [28] or the approach suggested 
in [39]. 
B. Control Model and Law 
The use of a finite state machine to give the control 
structure is not new, but we see it as a strength that the 
paradigm is used by other researchers (see the introduction). 
Our main reason for chosing such a restricted structure is 
that we would like a design to be consistent. It is fairly 
obvious that the specification of the automaton Phases has 
a model. We have taken some pains to give the phase-state 
constraints PhaseReq a form that ensures consistency. The 
system states HeatReq and Flame occurs only in the premise 
of the individual phase requirements, and only in the form of 
single occurrences of mutually exclusive state assertions, e.g. 
THeatReq and Heatreq. These states are thus free to vary in 
a model. The controlled states Ignition and Gas occur in the 
same form, but in the consequence for the individual phase 
requirements. It is thus posible to assign consistent values 
for each phase. We can also check that upper bounds on 
the duration of a single phase are higher than the possible 
lower bounds. For example, for Ignite2 we have an upper 
bound of 1 + c1 and lower bounds of 0 or 1. Thus the 
Phases and PhaseReq constraints have-a reasonable model. 
The assumptions A s m  might spoil this, but we have used a 
form where premisses contain mutually disjoint assertions on 
the controlled states, and consequences are constraints on the 
free state Flame. This leaves Heatreq unconstrained, as we 
expect it to be. 
We are less concerned with consistency of top-level require- 
ments. In fact, we expect them to be inconsistent at the start 
of a development-user expectations are generally too high. 
They will be relaxed during the design verification activity 
because it would be impossible to find a consistent design that 
satisfies all of them. 
The control law specification could be used directly for 
development of a program with shared variables, linking to 
such approaches as [6], [8], and [24]. We might add that 
a control law can be refined by expanding a phase into 
subphases, e.g., the division of the Ignite phase. We do 
not foresee problems with such serial refinements. They are 
analogous to refinement of sequential programs. 
The present formulation of control laws would also aid in a 
generalization to hybrid systems [25], [26], and [30] , where 
continuous physical states can be constrained by differential 
equations in the individual phases or in the assumptions. This 
requires an extension of the duration concept to properties of 
continuous states and a notation for initial values in an interval 
for such states. Such an extension was introduced in [37]. 
C. Verification 
With the restricted form of predicates used in the verifica- 
tion, there is some indication that these might be decidable. 
This would allow mechanical support for the tedious parts 
of the calculations. If a finite state machine is inadequate or 
inconvenient, it is possible to add further control state variables 
and thus get the full power of a Turing machine. This will, 
however, make verification more difficult because the phases 
may be interrelated in nonobvious ways. It would also make 
mechanized verification support difficult. 
D. Architecture, Components, and Scheduling 
We have not pursued the state machine approach for a dis- 
tributed architecture because of the involved proof obligations 
for shared variables. We have also refrained from pursuing 
an asynchronous event approach because timing constraints 
would have to be formulated as constraints on arrival and 
departure time for elements in unbounded buffers. We have 
seen dynamic buffer systems in practice, and they have not 
convinced us that arguments for timeliness are assisted by 
having global buffer pools. In the presentation, we have tried 
to build on the fundamental work by Reed on Timed CSP [38]. 
We have, however, yet to fully clearify the relations between 
our model and his hierarchy, The concept of a scheduler as an 
explicit component is elaborated in [48]. 
I T -  __ I 
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APPENDIX 
DEDUCTION SYSTEM, VERIFICATION 
General duration calculus is undecidable, and hence we 
cannot expect to find a complete set of axioms and deduction 
rules. The deductions in this paper may, hovewer, be based on 
the set of axioms and deduction rules given as follows. 
A suitably decorated P, r or V in the formulas denotes 
a state assertion, a nonnegative real number or a formula in 
duration calculus. Symbols ff and tt are the truth values for 
state assertions. Note that general laws of the propositional 
and predicate calculus are not included, whereas some laws of 
interval temporal logic are. 
Axiom I :  Iff = 0 
Axiom 2: J P  2 0 
Axiom 3: + JP2 = V P2) + A P2) 
Axiom 4: If r1 2 0 and r2 2 0, then 
Axiom 5: If PI e P2 is a valid state assertion, then 
JP1 = JP2 is an axiom. 
The following induction rule is sound due to the finite 
Induction Rule: If V( [ I )  is deduced, and 
V ( X  V (X; [PI)  V (X; [+I)) is deducible from V ( X ) ,  
It has a dual backward induction rule. 
The following are rules of interval logic used in calculations. 
Interval Law 1: Monotonic: If V1 + Vi and V2 + V; 
Interval Law 2: Associative: 
Interval Law 3: False-Zero: 
false V ;  false H fa1se;V 
Interval Law 4: Point-Unit: V e V ;  n e n ; V 
Interval Law 5: Chop-And: 
( J P  = r1); ( J P  = r2) * J P  = (7-1 + T P )  
variability of states. 
then V ( t r u e )  is deduced. 
then V1;V2 =+ Vi;V;.  
( 2 1 ; 2 ) 2 ) ; 2 ) 3  * vl; (%;v3) 
(vl; (v3 A c = r ) )  A ( v ~ ;  ( D ~  A e = r ) )  
=+ (Dl A V2); (D3 A 0 4 )  
=+ (Dl A V3); P 2  A 0 4 )  
(V1 v Vz);V3 * n;v3 v n;v3 
((Dl A t  = . ) ;&)A ((v3 A !  = r ) ; 0 4 )  
Interval Law 6: Chop-Or: 
vli(V2 v v3) * vl;V2 v vl;V3 
Interval Law 7: Chop-Neg: 
* ( true;  (lV2 A f? = T ) )  V (-VI; 1 = T-) V C < r 
((-Dl A e = r ) ;  true) V (c = r ;  -v2) V e < r 
-(vi; (v2 A e = T ) )  
-((vi A t  = ~ ) ; v , )  
Interval Law 8: Exists-Chop: 
(3.1 : T VI); V2 * 3v : T V I ;  232 provided v does not 
VI; (3v : T 0 V2) e 3v : T D1; V2 provided v does not 
The following derived laws have been useful: 
Law I :  Dur-Range: 0 5 J P  5 C 
Law 2: Dur-Negation: J-P = C e J P  = 0 
Law 3: Dur-Chop-Add: Given a predicate over reals 
R(r1,.  . . ,r,), which is preserved under addition, i.e., 
R(r1,.  . . , r,) A R ( r { ,  . . . , T A )  + R(r1 + r i ,  . . . , r ,  + TI), 
occur free in V2. 
occur free in VI. 
we have 
R(JP1,. . ., JPm); R(JP1,. . . 1  JPm) 
=+ R(JP1,. . . > JPm) 
Law 4: State-Variation: n v ( [ P I ;  true) v ([-P1; true) 
n v (true; [PI )  v (true; [+I) 
Law 5: State-And: [PI A Pz] * [PI] A rPz1 
Law 6: State-Or: [PI]  V [Pzl + [PI V P21 
Law 7: State-Negation: [ l P l  =+ l [ P 1  
Law 8: State-Imply: [PI + Pz] =+ ( [ P I ]  + [Pzl) 
Law 9: State-Always: [PI + U( [PI v n) 
Law I O :  State-Chop-And: 
Law 11: State-Chop: [PI;  [PI H [PI 
[PI A (IP11; IP21)  * ([PI A [Pllh ([Pl A rP21) 
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